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11. Introduction
It is commonplace to assume that agents are averse to risk or uncertainty in their income.
Yet the notion of aversion to income risks is really a derived concept, since what agents
ultimately care about is the consumption of consumer goods, and dislike income risks only
because of the risks it imposes on their consumption. So it is a little odd that the precise
connection between risk attitudes over income and risk attitudes over consumption goods
has never been formally explored. This note is an attempt to ﬁll this lacuna.
Formally, the issue we have in mind is the following. An agent has a preference over
bundles in the commodity space Rl
+ and also over lotteries of these bundles. Provided the
von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms are satisﬁed, there exists a Bernoulli utility function
u : Rl
+ ! R such that the utility of any lottery will be given by the expected value of the
Bernoulli utility.2 In other words, a lottery which gives the bundle x0 with probability t,
and x00 with probability 1 ¡ t, which we write as t ² x0 © (1 ¡ t) ² x00, will have a utility of
tu(x0)+(1¡t)u(x00). It is clear the the agent is risk averse in commodity space if and only
if u is concave. How is this related to his attitude over income risks?
Consider the lottery t ² y0 © (1 ¡ t) ² y00, where the agent has incomes y0 and y00 with
probabilities t and 1¡t respectively. Assume that the agent makes his consumer purchases
only after the uncertainty is resolved, that there is no price risk (so price is held ﬁxed at
p) and that he maximizes his utility given his realized budget constraint. In this case, the
utility of t ² y © (1 ¡ t) ² y00 must be given by tv(p;y0) + (1 ¡ t)v(p;y00), where v is the
indirect utility generated by u. The agent’s risk attitudes over income is measured by the
curvature of v as a function of income, with price held ﬁxed at p. If the agent is risk averse
2in income then v(p;¢) is concave. It is known that v(p;¢) is concave at all p if and only if
u is concave.3 In other words, an agent is risk averse in income at all prices if and only if
he is risk averse in commodity space. In this note, we sharpen this result by determining
precisely the risk attitudes over commodity space that is consistent with a particular level
of income risk aversion.
Suppose at the price p and income 1, the agent has a demand of x. Consider a lottery
t²x0©(1¡t)²x00, where p¢[tx0+(1¡t)x00] = 1. We know that a risk averse agent will surely
prefer x to this lottery: his risk aversion means he prefers the sure bundle tx0 + (1 ¡ t)x00
to the lottery, and this bundle in turn must not be preferred to x, since it is in the budget
set. But suppose we now oﬀer him the lottery t ² [(p ¢ x0)µ¡1x0] © (1 ¡ t) ² [(p ¢ x00)µ¡1x00].
By assumption p ¢ (tx0 + (1 ¡ t)x00) = 1; the price p gives this lottery a mean valuation of
(p ¢ x0)µ + (p ¢ x00)µ, which must be greater than 1 if µ is greater than 1 or less than 0. So it
is no longer the case that a risk averse agent must prefer the sure bundle x to the lottery;
we will call an agent who always prefers x to such lotteries µ-risk averse at p (with income
normalized at 1). We show that an agent is µ-risk averse at the prices ¸p for all ¸ > 0 if and
only if, at the price p, the agent’s coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion over all income levels has
an inﬁmum of 1 ¡ µ¡1, i.e., infy>0 R(p;y) = 1 ¡ µ¡1, where R(p;y) = ¡yvyy(p;y)=vy(p;y).
Section 2 of this note is devoted to this result and its variants.
When an agent is µ-risk averse, the Bernoulli utility function has a curvature property
we call µ-concavity. Section 3 of this note is devoted to a result which is very useful in
helping us visualize this property. If u is concave, we know that at any point (x;u(x)) on
its graph, there is a tangent plane which sits on top of the entire graph, so that the family
3of such planes form a nest around the graph of u. Formally, there are functions g and h
from Rl
++ to R such that u(x) = infr2Rl
++fg(r) + h(r)(r ¢ x)g. (Note that the graph of
the map from x to g(r) + h(r)(p ¢ x) is a hyperplane.) When u is µ-concave, we obtain the
following representation: u(x) = infr2Rl
++fg(r) + h(r)(r ¢ x)µg. So the graph of u is now
nested by a family of hypersurfaces of a particularly simple type, where each of them is the
graph of a function from x to g(r) + h(r)(r ¢ x)µ.
While we have chosen in this note to focus on the connection between risk aversion over
income and risk aversion over consumption, it should (or will) be clear to the reader that
the arguments could be easily adjusted to deal other issues; for example, the relationship
between the shape of the production function and the curvature of its cost curve. What we
develop here is a general mathematical theory which relates the curvature properties of an
objective function with the curvature, along rays emanating from the origin, of its dual, so
its potential applications go beyond the one discussed in this note.
2. Characterizing Risk Aversion Over Incomes
A function u : X ! R is called a utility function if it has the following properties: (i)
X is convex subset of Rl
+ and if x is in X, so is ¸x for any strictly positive scalar ¸; (ii)
for any x in X, u(¸x) > u(x) for any scalar ¸ > 1; (iii) for any (p;y) in Rl
++ £ R+, there
is ¯ x that maximizes u(x) in the set B(p;y) = fx 2 X : p ¢ x · yg. We refer to B(p;y)
as the budget set at the price-income situation (p;y) and to ¯ x as a demand at (p;y). We
denote the set of demands at (p;y) by f(p;y). The indirect utility function generated by u
refers to the function v : Rl
++ £ R+ ! R deﬁned by v(p;y) = u(¯ x) for any ¯ x in f(p;y). In
4some instances, we will impose an additional condition on the utility function u called the
supporting price property. By this, we mean that at every x in X, there is (p;1), with p in
Rl
++, such that x is in f(p;1).
All our deﬁnitions are standard and conditions which guarantee that a function u has the
properties we require are mild and well known (see Mas-Colell (1985)). It is most familiar
to have X as Rl
+ or Rl
++ but we also allow X to be smaller, for example, the intersection
of Rl
+ with a proper subspace of Rl. In other words, we permit the market for consumption
goods to be incomplete.
An agent’s attitude towards income risks is measured by the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion, with its value at (p;y) given by R(p;y) = ¡yvyy(p;y)=vy(p;y): Whenever we make
a statement referring to this coeﬃcient we are implicitly assuming that v is C2. Conditions
on u guaranteeing that v is C2 are known (see Mas-Colell (1985)).
Instead of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, we will mostly rely in this paper
on a measure of the curvature of v which does not require its diﬀerentiability. We say
that an increasing function F : R+ ! R is µ-concave if the map from y to F(yµ) is
concave. There is a particular ordering of the real numbers which is appropriate to this
concept. The total, transitive and irreﬂexive order <¤ is deﬁned as follows: 0 is ranked
lowest, any positive number has higher rank, and any positive number is ranked higher
than smaller positive numbers; any negative number has a higher rank than a positive
number, with large negative numbers ranked more highly than low negative numbers. For
example, 0 <¤ 2 <¤ 2000 < ¡2 <¤ ¡0:5 <¤ ¡0:01:::. We denote by sup¤(X) and max¤(X)
the supremum and maximum of the set X in R, with respect to the order <¤.4 The reason
5for introducing this order comes from the next simple observation, whose proof we will omit.
Lemma 1: An increasing function F : R+ ! R is µ-concave if and only if it is ®-concave
for all ® ·¤ ¯.
The notion of µ-concavity can be regarded as the non-diﬀerentiable analogue to the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, as the next lemma makes clear. Again we will skip the
straightforward proof.
Lemma 2: Infy>0R(p;y) = c if and only if max¤fµ : v(p;¢) is µ-concaveg = (1 ¡ c)¡1.
(Note that this lemma is applicable to c = 1 under the following convention, which we adopt
throughout this note: when c = 1, regard (1 ¡ c)¡1 = 1, so infy>0 R(p;y) = 1 if and only
if the map from y to v(p;yµ) is concave for all µ ¸ 0 and for no other µ.)
We wish to relate the concavity of v as a function of income with an appropriate notion
of concavity for the utility function u. We say that the utility function u is µ-concave at p if
u(x) ¸ tu((p¢x0)µ¡1x0)+(1¡t)u((p¢x00)µ¡1x00), whenever x is in f(p;1), 0 · t · 1, x0 and
x00 are in X, and p¢(tx0+(1¡t)x00) = 1. We say that u is µ-concave in the set P (contained
in Rl
++) if it is µ-concave at every p in P. Note that an agent’s utility function is µ-concave
at p if and only if he is µ-risk averse at p, in the sense deﬁned in the introduction, i.e., the
agent prefers the certain prospect x to the lottery t ² (p ¢ x0)µ¡1x0 © (1 ¡ t) ² (p ¢ x00)µ¡1x00.
The concept of µ-concavity is crucial to everything in this paper so we should discuss
it in some detail. Note ﬁrstly, that u is always 0-concave. The bundles (p ¢ x0)¡1x0 and
(p ¢ x00)¡1x00 are both aﬀordable at (p;1); since x is in f(p;1), u(x) must not be less than
than the utility of either bundle, nor any convex combination of their utilities. Secondly,
we note that if u is concave in the standard sense then it is 1-concave at all prices. To see
6that, we consider t, x0 and x00 satisfying p¢(tx0 +(1¡t)x00) = 1. Concavity guarantees that
tu(x0) + (1 ¡ t)u(x00) is less than or equal to u(tx0 + (1 ¡ t)x00), which is in turn no greater
than u(x) since x is in f(p;1) and tx0 + (1 ¡ t)x00 is in the budget. It is also clear that
if u is 1-concave at all prices and has the supporting price property, then it is a concave
function: let p be a supporting price at tx0 + (1 ¡ t)x00; then 1-concavity at p guarantees
that u(tx0 + (1 ¡ t)x00) ¸ tu(x0) + (1 ¡ t)u(x00). The next result shows that µ-concavity as
applied to u can be ordered in the same way as µ-concavity in one dimension.
Proposition 1: The utility function u is µ-concave at p if and only if it is ®-concave at
p for all ® ·¤ µ.
Proof: We ﬁrst make the following observation: if u is µ-concave at p, with µ ¸ 0
(alternately, with µ · 0), then u(x) ¸ tu((p ¢ x0)µ¡1x0) + (1 ¡ t)u((p ¢ x00)µ¡1x00) whenever
x is in f(p;1), t 2 [0;1] and p ¢ (tx0 + (1 ¡ t)x00) · (¸)1. To see this, we assume that
p¢(tx0 +(1¡t)x00) · 1 and choose ± such that p¢(t±x0 +(1¡t)±x00) = 1. Clearly, ± ¸ 1. If
u is µ-concave with µ ¸ 0 and since u is increasing in all arguments, we obtain
u(x) ¸ tu(±µ(p¢x0)µ¡1x0)+(1¡t)u(±µ(p¢x00)µ¡1x00) ¸ tu((p¢x0)µ¡1x0)+(1¡t)u((p¢x00)µ¡1x00):
The proof of the other case is the same.
We we will ﬁrst assume that µ ¸ 0 and show that u is ®-concave for ® in [0;µ]. Choose
z0 and z00 so that (p ¢ x0)®¡1x0 = (p ¢ z0)µ¡1z0 and (p ¢ x00)®¡1x00 = (p ¢ z00)µ¡1z00. Then
p ¢ [tz0 + (1 ¡ t)z00] = t(p ¢ x0)®=µ + (1 ¡ t)(p ¢ x00)®=µ
· [t(p ¢ x0) + (1 ¡ t)(p ¢ x00)]®=µ = 1;
so by the observation we ﬁrst made, tu((p ¢ x0)®¡1x0) + (1 ¡ t)u((p ¢ x00)®¡1x00) = tu((p ¢
7z0)µ¡1z0) + (1 ¡ t)u((p ¢ z00)µ¡1z00) must be no greater than u(x).
For µ < 0, we wish to show that u is ®-concave whenever ® · µ or ® ¸ 0. To see this,
we ﬁrst deﬁne z0 and z00 as above and then notice that p¢[tz0+(1¡t)z00] ¸ 1 provided ® ¸ 0
or ® · µ. The rest of the proof is then analogous to the case of µ ¸ 0. QED
The next theorem is our main result and gives us the relationship between the concavity
of u and the concavity of its indirect utility function v, as a function of income.
Theorem 1: The indirect utility function v is such that v(p;¢) is µ-concave if and only if
u is µ-concave in the set [p] = f¸p : ¸ > 0g.
Proof: To prove necessity, we write ¯ p = ¸p for some positive number ¸, and suppose
that x is in f(¯ p;1). If ¯ p ¢ [tx0 + (1 ¡ t)x00] = 1,
u(x) = v(¯ p;1) = v(¯ p;[t(¯ p ¢ x0) + (1 ¡ t)(¯ p ¢ x00)]µ)
¸ tv(¯ p;(¯ p ¢ x0)µ) + (1 ¡ t)v(¯ p;(¯ p ¢ x00)µ)
¸ tu((¯ p ¢ x0)µ¡1x0) + (1 ¡ t)u((¯ p ¢ x00)µ¡1x00);
The ﬁrst inequality follows from the µ-concavity of v(¯ p;¢) (which in turn follows from that
of v(p;¢)) and the second from the deﬁnition of v. So u is µ-concave at ¯ p.
For suﬃciency, we ﬁrst assume that ty0 + (1 ¡ t)y00 = 1. The agent has a demand at
(p;y0µ), which can always be expressed in the form (p ¢ x0)µ¡1x0. Similarly, we can write a
demand at (p;y00µ) as (p ¢ x00)µ¡1x00. The budget identity guarantees that p ¢ x0 = y0 and
p ¢ x00 = y00. If x is in f(p;1), the µ-concavity of u at p guarantees that
tv(p;y0µ) + (1 ¡ t)v(p;y00µ) = tu((p ¢ x0)µ¡1x0) + (1 ¡ t)u((p ¢ x00)µ¡1x00)
· u(x) = v(p;1):
8In general, if ty0 + (1 ¡ t)y00 = ¯ y then t(y0=¯ y) + (1 ¡ t)(y00=¯ y) = 1. Since u is µ-concave

































equivalently, we have tv(p;y0µ) + (1 ¡ t)v(p;y00µ) · v(p;(ty0 + (1 ¡ t)y00)µ). QED
This theorem says in particular that v(p;¢) is 1-concave, i.e., is a concave function, if and
only if u is 1-concave in the set [p]. As we had pointed out earlier, the 1-concavity of u is
equivalent to the concavity of u provided u has the supporting price property. So, assuming
this property, Theorem 1 recovers the known result that v is a concave function of income
at all prices if and only if u is concave. Of course the theorem says quite a bit more. The
next corollary is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2 and Theorem 1: it gives the precise
level of risk averse behavior over commodities which guarantees a particular inﬁmum over
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion over income.
Corollary 1: Infy>0R(p;y) = c if and only if max¤fµ : u is µ-concave in [p]g = (1 ¡
c)¡1.
The global results we have obtained so far can easily be re-stated as local results once the
deﬁnitions are suitably modiﬁed. In particular, we say that u is locally µ-concave at p if there
is ² > 0 such that u(x) ¸ tu((p¢x0)µ¡1x0)+(1¡t)u((p¢x00)µ¡1x00) whenever x is a demand at
p, t is in [0;1], x0 and x00 are in X, p¢(tx0+(1¡t)x00) = 1, and maxfjp¢x0¡1j;jp¢x00¡1jg · ²: It
is trivial to see that Proposition 1 remains true if µ-concavity is replaced by its local version.
In other words, local µ-concavity has the same ranking property as µ-concavity. We say that
v(p;¢) is locally µ-concave at ¯ y if there is a neighborhood around ¯ y such that the map from
y to v(p;yµ) is concave. With this deﬁnition, the following local analog to Theorem 1 is
9easy to check: v(p;¢) is locally µ-concave at 1 if and only if u is locally µ-concave at p. The
next result, which is the local analog of Corollary 1, should then be unsurprising.
Corollary 2: R(p;1) = c if and only if sup¤fµ : u is locally µ-concave at pg = (1¡c)¡1.
Proof: Suppose R(p;1) = c; since v is C2, for any ² > 0, there is some neighborhood of
income around 1 such that R(p;y) > c¡² in that neighborhood. It is easy to check that this
guarantees that v(p;¢) is locally (1¡c+²)¡1-concave at 1, which implies that u is locally (1¡
c+²)¡1-concave at p. Letting ² go to zero, we obtain sup¤fµ : u is locally µ-concave at pg ¸
(1 ¡ c)¡1. But the inequality cannot be strict; if it were, there will be µ0 > (1 ¡ c)¡1 such
that u is locally µ0-concave at p. This implies that v(p;¢) is locally µ0-concave at income 1,
which means that R(p;1) > c: a contradiction. QED
3. A Representation Theorem for µ-Concave Functions
Our main task in this section is to proof the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Suppose u : X ! R is a utility function with the supporting price property.
If u is µ-concave at all prices, for µ 6= 0, then there exists maps from g and h from Rl
++
to R such that u(x) = infr2Rl
++fg(r) + h(r)(r ¢ x)1=µg; where h > 0 if µ > 0 and h < 0 if
µ < 0.
Our proof will take an instructive roundabout approach, by ﬁrst constructing a represen-
tation for the indirect utility function. This representation is analogous to that established
for nondecreasing and convex-along-rays functions by Rubinov and Glover (1999).
Lemma 3: Suppose v(p;¢) is µ-concave at all prices p. If µ > 0, there exists maps g and
10h from Rl















For µ < 0, the representation is the same, but with h < 0 and max replaced by min.
Proof: We denote (p¡µ
1 ;p¡µ
2 ;:::;p¡µ
l ) by p¡µ. It is not hard to check that since v is
homogeneous of degree zero, the µ-concavity of v(p;¢) for all p will mean that the map
˜ v : Rl
++ ! R, which maps p to v(p¡µ;1) is concave along rays, i.e., ˜ v(tp + (1 ¡ t)¸p) ¸
t˜ v(p) + (1 ¡ t)˜ v(¸p), for any ¸ > 0 and t in [0;1]. If µ > 0, ˜ v is also an increasing function
of p. At any point r in Rl
++, we let h(r) > 0 be a slope, along the ray, of ˜ v at r. Note
that since ˜ v is increasing, for any r, ˜ v(p) · ˜ v((maxi pi=ri)r): The latter is in turn bounded
above by ˜ v(r) + h(r)((maxi pi=ri) ¡ 1). Therefore, we see that







for all r. This gives us the result since the inﬁmum of the right hand side of this inequality
for r in Rl
++ is achieved at r = p. The case of µ < 0 has an analogous proof. QED
Proof of Theorem 3: Since u has the supporting price property, for any x in Rl
++,
u(x) = minfp2Rl
++:p¢x=1g v(p;1). Theorem 1 tells us that since u is µ-concave in Rl
++, v(p;¢)










































11Our ﬁnal result uses Theorem 3 to give a sharper characterization of the µ-concavity
of u in those cases where u is a concave function; in other words, when 1 ·¤ µ. This
characterization is particularly nice since, unlike the deﬁnition of µ-concavity, it does not
make any reference to the demand bundle at a price.
Corollary 4: Suppose that the utility function u : X ! R has the supporting price
property. Then u is µ-concave at all prices for some 1 ·¤ µ if and only if the following is
true: for any p À 0, t in [0;1], and x0 and x00 in Rl
++ satisfying p ¢ (tx0 + (1 ¡ t)x00) = 1,
we have u(tx0 + (1 ¡ t)x00) ¸ tu((p ¢ x0)µ¡1x0) + (1 ¡ t)u((p ¢ x00)µ¡1x00).
Proof: Note that the ‘if’ part of this claim is clearly guaranteed by revealed preference.
For the other direction, we ﬁrst observe that when u has the representation given in Theorem





















Since tp¢x0 +(1¡t)p¢x00 = 1, if µ ¸ 1 (< 0), the right hand side of this equation is weakly













As h is positive in the ﬁrst instance and negative in the second, we have shown that tu((p¢






r ¢ (tx0 + (1 ¡ t)x00)
¢1=µg = u(tx0 + (1 ¡ t)x00):
12This completes the proof since 1 ·¤ µ if and only if µ ¸ 1 of µ < 0. QED
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